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Introduction
    The Iran-Iraq war has aptly been described as the Third World's first Great War.1  Conventional
assessments of the costs of the war tend to focus upon lost oil revenues, declining GNPs, material
destruction and even body counts.2  Estimates suggest that 1.2 million lives were lost in the war, with
a further 2.2 million wounded.  Up to 1.5 million people were uprooted by the fighting.  At least 157
Iranian towns with populations of more than 5,000 were damaged or wholly destroyed during the
war, and some 1,800 border villages were virtually wiped off the map.3  This concern with macro-
economic indicators or quantifiable measures of the war's destruction, however, all serve to obscure
its dramatic social costs.  The Iran-Iraq war profoundly affected the balance of social forces in both
countries by eroding the social power of oppressed groups and classes and working exclusively to
the advantage of the ruling regimes.  These social costs are the greatest legacy of the Iran-Iraq war;
its lingering social effects will be felt for many years to come.
This paper calls attention to the social costs of the war through an exploration of its social
foundations.  The Iran-Iraq war was largely engendered through the play of indigenous social forces.
External actors had little direct role in its outbreak.  In its most straightforward formulation, the Iran-
Iraq war may be understood as a dramatic political manifestation of extended social struggles
endemic to both societies.  We must contemplate this war, therefore, from the perspective of the
Iranian and Iraqi social tapestries first and foremost.  Analysis must unravel the complex class,
communal and state dynamics at work in both countries.  Through this society-centred approach we
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will arrive at a richer account of the origins of the Iran-Iraq war, a clearer explanation of its
protracted course and why efforts to resolve it relatively quickly were largely unsuccessful, and
foster a deeper appreciation of its stunning social costs.
PART I: CONVENTIONAL APPROACHES TO WAR
    An approach to the causes of war which begins by addressing societal dynamics finds little
precedent in international relations research.  Most analysis can be summarized in terms of the ` three
images' posited by Kenneth Waltz more than three decades ago: the individual, the state and the
international anarchy.4  Related work on the causes of war has attempted to bridge or wed these
various levels of analysis.5  Another trend in the literature examines the different spheres of human
activity - technological, economic, political, legal and historical - and presents various combinations
of these spheres as an explanation for international war.6  A final approach focuses upon different
modes of social conflict - interpersonal, familial, organizational, societal etcetera - and then grafts
its conclusions onto the realm of international relations.7
Absent from this inquiry has been the attempt to develop a theoretical understanding of the
relationship between societal dynamics and war.  There have been some important hints and
suggestions in the literature, but these have not been accompanied by sustained theoretical
refinement.  Marxist debates on imperialism, for example, have drawn direct attention to the
relationship between the international capitalist class and war.8  Similarly, Karl Polanyi's argument
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concerning haute finance and World War I focused implicitly upon international class fractions and
the development of war.9  Alternatively, Perry Anderson's Lineages of the Absolutist State explores
the social basis of the relationship between the mercantilist outlook of the early modern era and the
war prone character of the Absolutist states.10   The focus upon social and political development in
the modernization literature resulted in a partial examination of the relationship between society,
politics and international conflict.11  Finally, some of the literature examining the causes of the
World War I addressed the relationship between communal conflict and war.12  Despite these
exceptions, however, there has been no theoretical development around the social origins of war.
     Recent research on the causes of war evinces a growing awareness of this theoretical lacunae.13
Undoubtedly, this scholarly agenda is informed by the fecund theoretical debate on the state and
society which has taken place in the last two decades.14  We see the effects of this debate within other
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corners of the international relations field.  The critiques of Immanuel Wallerstein's world systems
analysis or of dependency theory, for example, have argued strenuously in favour of an explicit
examination of society.15  Another corner of international relations research calls for a thorough
reconsideration of the conventional conceptualization of the state in order to take adequate account
of the structures of society.16  At least one theoretician in the field has explicitly raised the possibility
of considering the `state/society complex as the basic unit of international relations' in order to
amplify societal level dimensions.17
     From the vantage point of the fertile academic debate on the state and society this paper amplifies
the social nature of international relations' most enduring subject matter: war.  In flushing out the
social dimensions of war we can contemplate a number of themes broadly stemming from the
complex relationship between production and politics in society.  One body of themes addresses
conflict between classes, within fractions of the same class and between local and international
classes.  The relationship of the state to these configurations of social classes constitutes another
important set of themes.  Discussion in this regard has centred around the relative autonomy of the
state from particular social classes and class fractions, and has increasingly argued that the state itself
warrants considerable attention, but that the state does not escape the constraining pressures
emanating from social forces in society.  State institutions, in other words, are embedded in an array
of contradictory social forces; state power is not aloof from the disposing and conditioning features
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of the social canvas.18  The society-centred approach, therefore, explicitly addresses the state, but
does so in the context of its constraining social base.  A final set of themes draws attention towards
non-class elements of social consciousness - such as ethnicity or gender - and frequently discusses
these issues in terms of social power and social conflict.19
     In the specific context of the Third World, moreover, a set of themes emerge that are broadly
related to the rapid transformation of society in the face of the extension of capitalist relations of
production in the Twentieth Century.20  One set of themes concerns the growth of new classes and
their relationship with older established classes and the ruling classes.  Extreme social dislocation
and marginalization forms a second cluster of themes, and here we can consider the erosion of
centuries-old customs and practices, the weakening of traditional social affiliations and the
accompanying search for new forms of social identity, heavy migration to urban centres and the
progressive deterioration of living conditions for large segments of the population.  Extended social
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conflict constitutes another body of themes, with these conflicts being animated by both class and
communal motifs.21  With these themes in mind we now turn to consider the social origins of the
Iran-Iraq war.
PART II: SOCIAL ORIGINS OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR
     At least five different explanations for the Iran-Iraq war have appeared in academic and
journalistic commentary.  The first account draws attention to the deeply rooted cultural enmity
between Iran and Iraq and is premised upon a sense of incompatible and immanently hostile societies
characterized in racial (Aryan and Semite), sectarian (Shi'i and Sunni), ethnic (Arab and Persian) or
religious (secular and fundamentalist) terms.22  A second explanation calls attention to the
megalomaniacal tendencies of Saddam Hussein: ` I think the whole question of how this war began,'
Samir al-Khalil writes, ` resolves itself into what was passing through Saddam Hussein's mind.'  This
explanation finds confirmation in the name given to the war by Iraq - Qadisiyyat Saddam - and in
the argument that Saddam Hussein was successful in extricating himself from any meaningful
political constraints in Iraq.  A third account focuses upon the declining Iranian hegemony in the
Gulf region after the revolution.  This regional power vacuum afforded the Ba'th regime in Iraq
unique opportunities to extend its regional influence and enhance its Arab stature.  A common fourth
account of the war suggests that Iran was attacked simply because its inflammatory Shi'i rhetoric was
fuelling revolutionary sentiments among the Shi'i population in Iraq.  A final explanation focuses
upon territorial disputes between the two states, especially those arising over the Shatt al-Arab
waterway.  The basic cut of this argument draws attention to Iraq's dislike of the 1975 Algiers
Agreement which established the boundary of the Shatt al-Arab according to the thalweg (mid-
channel) principle rather than the eastern shoreline:  ` Even if Iraq and Iran were homogeneous, even
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if Iraq had no Shi'i problem,' stresses Daniel Pipes, `the Shatt al-Arab issue would have sufficed to
cause war to break out in 1980'.23
     Although each of these accounts of the war contains a kernel of truth, as a collection of
explanations they remain woefully inadequate in that they fail to socially contextualize the Iran-Iraq
war.  They afford little attention to the complex social dynamics at work within either country.
Frequently, as in the case of the cultural explanations or the focus upon Hussein's psyche, these
accounts of the war entirely overlook the complex array of social forces within Iraq.  Similarly, even
when attention is given to social divisions within society, as in those explanations addressing the
Shi'i threat to the Ba'th regime in Iraq, little additional effort is made to understand Shi'i politics in
terms of other dynamics and struggles within Iraqi society.  Again, explanations which call attention
to territorial disputes such as the Shatt al-Arab or to regional aspirations in the Gulf generally
overlook the relationship of these factors to dynamic class and communal developments within
either society.  These accounts tend to separate the `causes' of the Iran-Iraq war from the broader
social dynamics unfolding within each country.  In other words, as real as the war may be, it is not
understood as a social reality.  By default, these musings carelessly reify most facets of the war and
thereby fail to understand its social costs, especially in terms of the extension of oppressive relations
within Iran and Iraq.  Explanations which neglect the social foundations of the Iran-Iraq war are, at
best, partial accounts; at worst, the interventionist parturitions of discussions which fail to appreciate
the social realities underlining war may be politically naïve and grossly misguided.
     In the broadest possible terms we begin to detect the origins of the Iran-Iraq war by understanding
the interaction between ` forces from the international environment and specific local processes and
structures with their own specific logic' throughout the Twentieth Century.24  Only the broadest
sketches of these developments may be adumbrated here.25  Political and economic imperatives in
the early twentieth century determined that the state boundaries of the two countries would not be
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drawn in accordance with the multi-ethnic character of the region.  Both Iran and Iraq were gradually
integrated into the world economy and capitalist relations of production have been continually
extended throughout both countries.  The central economic sector catalyzing these transformations
was hydrocarbon extraction and processing.  The Iraqi and Iranian states were instrumental in
facilitating the processes of economic transformation in both countries, and played increasing roles
in the economy throughout the post-war period.  Agrarian reforms in both countries largely resulted
in deteriorating production and spawned increased migration into the urban centres.  In terms of class
structure there was the growth of working classes, new intermediate classes including salaried
professionals, intellectuals and teachers and a small indigenous bourgeoisie.  At the same time the
political and social influence of the clerical and traditional petty bourgeoisie undulated under the
pressures of economic modernization; in the case of the landed classes agrarian reforms caused their
political influence to wane significantly.26  It is commonplace to observe that the favourable effects
of the particular path of socio-economic development in Iran and Iraq were highly skewed in favour
of thin segments at the top of society while increasing privation and social marginalization plagued
the largest segments of the population.  Major urban centres - especially Tehran and Baghdad - have
acquired squalid slums under the pressures of urban migration as individuals search for a better life
in the towns and cities.
     Political development was not commensurate with socio-economic change in either country
throughout most of the post-war period.  In the case of Iraq, political control of the state remained
somewhat fluid between 1958 and 1968 until the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party successfully resecure
control.  Iran, from 1953 up to the Islamic revolution, was ruled by the Phavlavi monarchy.  In both
countries, through a combination of shear wealth via the oil rent and well-honed repressive
apparatuses, the ruling regimes were able to acquire considerable degrees of conjunctural autonomy
from any particular social class.  Conventional political parties and alternative political organizations
were systematically attacked and rendered largely ineffective.  Consequently, while the socio-
economic transformations of Twentieth Century Iran and Iraq created new social expectations and
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demands among classes and groups in both societies, the political avenues to address these demands
were progressively closed off.  Increasingly, political opposition manifested itself in the form of
direct attacks against the regime and in protracted struggles in the countryside.  The disjuncture
between the political sphere and the socio-economic sphere in both Iran and Iraq has produced
extremely volatile political conditions for the ruling regimes.  In the case of Iran, of course, the
incongruity between the political and socio-economic worlds fostered the sustained struggles
throughout the latter half of the 1970s that culminated in the Islamic revolution.
     It is within this transformed social canvas that we can detect the origins of the Iran-Iraq war.  The
socio-economic transformations of the Twentieth Century set in motion distinct social and political
struggles that culminated in the three crucial political dimensions most closely associated with the
outbreak of the war: the inflamed Islamic rhetoric emanating from Iran in the aftermath of the
revolution; the alarmed Ba'thi response in the face of a perceived Shi'i uprising in Iraq; and the Iraqi
Ba'th attempts to secure and stabilize oil export revenues.  Expressed differently, the political
aspirations and vulnerabilities that impelled both regimes to war for almost eight years are stained
by the structural disjunctures between the political and socio-economic spheres in Iraqi and Iranian
society, disjunctures that in turn are fundamentally signatured by the class and communal struggles
engendered by the broad socio-economic transformations in these societies throughout the Twentieth
Century.  This paper now examines the social basis of the Iranian revolution, the Shi'i struggles in
Iraq and attempts by the Baghdad regime to secure oil export revenues.
The Iranian Revolution
     In the aftermath of the Mossadeq downfall in 1953 the Shah consolidated power with
considerable assistance from SAVAK.27  The Shah's political strategy of wooing traditional classes,
including the bazaaris and the landed class, and containing the modern classes was weakened by an
10
     28  See discussion in Ervand Abrahamian, op. cit., pp. 429-
435.
     29  For an extremely interesting analysis of the Iranian
revolution see: Ervand Abrahamian, ` Structural Causes of
the Iranian Revolution,' MERIP Reports, no. 87 (May
1980).  Abrahamian's thesis remains one the clearest and
most succinct accounts of the revolution: `... the
economic crisis in the early 1960s and American pressures for land reform.  With restlessness
increasing among the subordinate classes the Shah implemented a series of policy reforms
collectively known as the White Revolution.  Central among these reforms was the Land Reform
Law of 1962 which successfully broke the backs of the traditional landed classes, a development
which reflected the growing influence of the modern, urban classes in Iranian society.  In the
economic sphere, the Shah attempted to modernize the Iranian economy through import-substitution-
industrialization and attempts to untie the Iranian dependence upon oil.  As the Shah moved to
supplant the traditional economy he came into directly conflict with the bazaar class of merchants
and traders, a conflict that would eventually prove devastating for the monarchy.  Attempts at
economic modernization were also accompanied by agricultural reforms that continually failed to
meet production expectations.
     On the eve of the Iranian revolution the urban classes included the bourgeoisie, propertied middle
classes including the bazaaris, smaller entrepreneurs and some 90,000 clergymen, a salaried middle
class of over half a million and a large working class.  In the countryside there were absentee
farmers, independent farmers and khoshneshin - agricultural labourers -numbering at one million
families.28  Although the monarchy catered to the requirements of the upper class in Iran, through
the oil rent and the well honed police state it developed considerable autonomy from direct class
influence.  Increasingly, in the repressive political atmosphere under the Shah, socio-economic
demands failed to receive an adequate political hearing.  The grievances of all subordinated classes
against the regime were heightened with the economic crisis of the mid-1970s, and the stability of
the monarchy became increasingly tenuous.  This social disenchantment with the monarchy was
exacerbated by the untimely formalization of a one-party system by the Shah, a move interpreted by
the opposition as a brazen promulgation of political closure in Iran.  At the same time unique
political openings were created through the momentary weakening of the Shah's repressive state.
Increasing social agitation and protest from the modern and traditional middle classes, the working
classes and the urban poor culminated in a six month generalized strike in 1978.  Ultimately, these
struggles, along with a loss of support within the army rank and file and a loss of confidence in
Washington combined to overthrow the monarchy.29
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     The revolution was for the most part urban based and primarily employed political confrontation
in its struggle against the regime.  An extremely diverse collection of classes and groups had
coalesced against the Shah.  Despite the diverse collection of groupings, however, the Islamic
character of the revolution is indisputable.  A handful of reasons underline this ideological colouring.
Most importantly, there was an organic link between the bazaaris and the clergy.  The matrix of the
revolutionary ideology in Iran lies in the reaction of the clerics and the bazaaris to the socio-
economic trends of the Twentieth Century.  Both social classes felt increasingly frustrated and
threatened by the secularizing and modernizing trends under the Shah.  The bazaaris in particular
were directly attacked by the Shah through such policies as the anti-profiteering campaign of the
mid-1970s.  This class found ideological leadership in Islam, and the alliance with the clergy would
ultimately be secured by Islam's `sanction of private property'.30  In turn, the traditional petty
bourgeoisie formed the primary social base of the `ulama.
     Other factors combined to insure that the revolution would have a distinctly Islamic hue.  As an
integral element of Iranian culture, Islam naturally structured social grievances, especially in view
of the lack of alternative opportunities for political expression, and in particular it provided an
ideational blueprint for social frustrations with the monarchy:  ` The Islamic ideology was important
insofar as it gave form,' Farideh Farhi observes, `to already existing grievances against a foreign-
dominated, repressive state.'31  In organizational terms as well, the mosque network was crucial for
communication and mobilization within the repressive political atmosphere under the Shah.  The
combined effect insured that the religious network would become a highly politicized venue.  `The
mosque became a key rallying place for people to express grievances and hold mourning
ceremonies,' Misagh Parsa writes, `which were not only religious occasions but also provided
12
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opportunities for political expression.'32   Moreover, the charismatic figure of Khomeini provided
a rallying point for the revolution.  As one scholar notes: `Khomeini is to the Islamic Revolution
what Lenin was to the Bolshevik, Mao to the Chinese, and Castro to the Cuban revolutions.'33  The
Islamic character of the Iranian revolution, therefore, cannot be solely understood as a manifestation
of any intrinsically animating qualities that Shi'ism may possess.  Rather, the links between the
clerics and the bazaaris and the reaction of both these classes to the threats of secularization and
modernization, the organizational importance of the mosque network in the repressive political
atmosphere, the cultural importance of Islam and the charismatic figure of Khomeini all combined
to insure that the revolution would have a distinctive Islamic hue.
     In the immediate aftermath of the revolution the Provisional Revolutionary Government exercised
formal power.  The PRG tended to view the revolution exclusively in terms of a transformation of
political structures, and they naturally sought to promote the private sector.  Ultimately, the PRG
proved incapable of addressing heightened class conflicts spurred on by rising social expectations
among peasants, workers and the urban masses.34  De facto state power devolved into the hands of
the Islamic fundamentalists.  With a diverse range of potential opposition including the secular left
as well as the liberal-moderates, the ascendancy of the clerics would certainly not go unchallenged.35
The clergy, with strong links to the popular organizations that spontaneously arose during the
revolution, was able to consolidate its power through massive political mobilization.  This
mobilization was nurtured through a form of theocratic populism wherein Islam provided the
nourishment and cohesion for a political project that was essentially manipulative in character, which
concerned itself with the interests of the `masses', and which adopted a clearly xenophobic
character.36  The struggle of the `ulama to consolidate its power and extend its class hegemony
13
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would ensure that the Islamic motifs and symbols would be exploited to the fullest extent possible.
In the end, Islamic themes blended with this-worldly struggles to produce the new Islamic Republic.
     The conflicting and erratic nature of Iran's foreign policy in the immediate aftermath of the
revolution reflected the intense internal power struggle.37  The steady ascendancy of the clerics,
however, increasingly brought coherence to Iranian foreign policy, and it is here that we see the
germination of the aggressive campaign against Iraq.  By itself, the ascendancy of the clerics and the
Islamic character of the revolution go a considerable distance in explaining the external agitation by
the Iranian regime.  Among the ideologues, for example, the Islamic narratives of overthrowing
impious states (futah) were undoubtedly operative.38  Nevertheless, the theocratic populist project
adopted by the clerics insured that Islamic themes would be trumpeted far and wide.  Stated simply,
there was no cultural imperative unfolding in the Gulf region in the early 1980s.  The theocrats were
equally motivated by the somewhat more temporal concern of consolidating their grip on the state.
As a result, Iran was exporting revolution as part of the process of consolidating the revolution at
home.  External agitation became an integral element in the politics of refraction whereby popular
frustrations were adroitly grafted onto Satanic foes.  In the case of Iraq the aggressive campaign took
numerous forms including radio broadcasts, direct acts of sabotage and support for its Shi'i groups.
The campaign evoked extreme concern among the Iraqi Ba'th regime.
The Iraqi Response
     The alarmed Iraqi reaction to the Iranian campaign forms the second crucial political dimension
relevant to the outbreak of the war.  This reaction, however, cannot be properly understood apart
from the pattern of socio-economic evolution of Twentieth Century Iraq.  The social structure of
contemporary Iraq is the product of the gradual insertion of the three vilayets of Basra, Baghdad and
Mosul into the world economy.39  The first phase of this insertion revolved around agricultural
exports and led to the formation of a latifundista style of agricultural production with the rise of a
14
     40  The term latifundista is borrowed from the Latin American
case which summarizes the experience of large
landholdings, few landowners and a large and increasingly
impoverished peasant class.
     41  These developments receive their best documentation in
Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the
Revolutionary Movement in Iraq, (Princeton University
Press, 1978).
     42  See: Joe Stork, `Class, State and Politics in Iraq', in
Power and Stability in the Middle East, ed., Berch
Berberoglu (Zed Books, 1989).
     43  For a discussion of developments within the Iraqi
security apparatus see: al-Khalil, op. cit., chapter 1.
landowning class, a peasant class and a mercantile bourgeoisie.40  In the second phase of this
insertion, however, the oil industry has largely charted the course of Iraqi economic and social
development.  The development of an urban working class resulted in the formation of the Iraqi
Communist Party by 1941.41  By the late 1970s there was a working class, traditional and modern
middle classes (including an abnormally large pool of salaried state workers as the regime attempted
to absorb as much of the surplus workforce as possible), rural agricultural workers and a smaller
industrial bourgeoisie.42  These class developments paved the way for conflicts that resulted in a
considerable fluidity in Iraqi politics throughout the post-war period, a fluidity broadly guided on
the one hand by the struggle of middle classes and class fractions to assert their class hegemony and
on the other hand by struggle between them and the political expressions of the working class,
especially the ICP.  These political struggles culminated in the second accession of the Arab Ba'th
Socialist Party to power in 1968.
     A crucial development in post-war Iraqi politics has been the ability of the Iraqi state to acquire
considerable autonomy from any particular social class.  The matrix of this development has been
the access of the state to huge oil revenues, fully secured with the nationalization of the Iraqi
Petroleum Company in the spring of 1972.  One important political implication of these revenues
lies in the development of a soberingly repressive political order.  The repressive apparatus of the
state includes the Amn (Internal State Security), the Estikhbarat (Military Intelligence) and the very
powerful Mukhabarat (Party Intelligence) along with the regular army and the party militia.43  The
effectiveness of these state institutions has resulted in the liquidation of alternative political
organizations within Iraq.  This process began in earnest in the post-1968 period and was essentially
completed by the late 1970s.  On the legal terrain, for example, failure to declare affiliation with
alternative political parties was punishable by death, while declarations of alternative affiliations
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were not terribly wise.  The net effect was the creation of a political vacuum both at the
organizational level and in terms of the progressive narrowing of public discourse and debate to the
pale of the Ba'thi world view.  Indeed, one interpretive history of contemporary Iraq has gone as far
as to speak of the `death of politics' within the country.44
     The second political implication of this wealth has been the overwhelming influence of the Ba'th
in Iraqi politics.  Notwithstanding the petty bourgeois character of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party in
Iraq in 1968, oil revenues have by and large allowed the political direction of the Ba'th to proceed
according to its own logic, a logic fundamentally guided by the imperative of regime maintenance.
Although the Ba'th regime rests upon an extremely narrow social footing, no other political group
in Iraqi society has been able to acquire the resources to crack this Ba'thi monopoly.  Until the mid-
1970s the Iraqi Communist Party stood the best chance of wrestling meaningful concessions from
the regime.  The Progressive Patriotic National Front of 1973 between the Ba'th and the Iraqi
Communist Party, however, proved to be an extended cooptive strategy on the part of the Ba'th, and
by 1979 the once powerful ICP was essentially driven underground.45  As a result of the repressive
political atmosphere and the extensive Ba'thization of Iraqi society, political control in post-1968
Iraq has increasingly evolved onto the Ba'th, and within the party onto Saddam Hussein and his
ruling coterie.
     Consequently, although the transformed structure of Iraqi society created a wide range of socio-
economic and political interests as it evolved in the post-war period, the means for addressing them
were systematically choked off during the 1960s and 1970s.  In the case of labour, for example, the
regime removed its right to strike.  The Ba'th, of course, attempted to deal with these grievances by
penetrating peasant co-operative societies, trade unions, women's organizations or youth
organizations.  The political agenda here, however, was one of manipulation in order to render the
activities of these groups more commensurate with Ba'thi needs and interests.  At the same time the
state created its own interest groups in order to promote Ba'thi goals.  One such body was the
General Federation of Iraqi Women, an organization primarily oriented towards furthering Ba'thi
breeding requirements.46  The obliteration of alternative mediums of political expression in Iraq was
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tantamount to a form of disempowerment on the part of aggrieved groups and classes within Iraqi
society.
     This specific political and social conjuncture helps to explain the rise of a Shi'i opposition within
Iraq during the late 1970s.  On the one hand, the traditional clerical class was reacting both to its loss
of material support and its loss of prestige in the face of the social changes engendered by the
modernizing and secularizing tendencies of the Ba'th.  As one writer straightforwardly noted: `The
`ulama were losing ground and declining in prestige and material influence.'47  The initial
manifestations of this restlessness could be seen in the rise of the Fatimiyyah in 1964.  By the late
1970s two Shi'i parties could be identified: ad-Da'wah al-Islamiyyah (the Islamic Call) and al-
Mujahidin (the Muslim Warriors).  Moreover, Islamic motifs around legitimacy and political
obedience undoubtedly helped to give form to existing social grievances arising out of the extreme
poverty and political marginalization of the masses.48  Specifically, from its formative stage onwards,
Shi'ism was identified with `the rebellion and struggle of the downtrodden and oppressed in the
Islamic empire, and its doctrines accommodated their aspirations for social justice and equality.'49
Shi'ism clearly had the capacity, as evident in Iran, to structure and animate social struggles against
the Ba'th.  Finally, Iraq's socio-economic evolution guaranteed that serious grievances against the
regime would arise.  Development throughout the post-war period in Iraq was accompanied by
extreme social dislocation, particularly as rural reforms eroded living conditions in the countryside
and prompted massive migration into the urban centres.  These rapidly shifting demographics
contributed to the rise of deplorable living conditions in the towns and cities.  One such settled area
around greater Baghdad, Madinat ath-Thawrah, an area where the ICP once garnered much of its
support, proved to be one of the main bases of Shi'i support in the late 1970s.  Originally designed
to house no more than 300,000 people, its population inflated to 1.5 million.  The slums of Madinat
ath-Thawrah have been identified as `the stronghold of heroes' in militant Shi'i literature.
     By the late 1970s the processionals of Islam became important political stages.  Demonstrations
in Shi'i towns and Shi'i neighbourhoods of Baghdad significantly increased as did clashes with the
police.  At one such procession in 1977 between Najaf and Karbala the crowds aggressively chanted:
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`Saddam, remove your hand!  The people of Iraq do not want you!'  Guerilla attacks upon the police,
the Ba'th Party and the popular army were stepped up.  The Iraqi regime responded with tarhib
(terror) on the one hand and targhib (the proverbial carrot) on the other.50  In the spring of 1980
Baqir as-Sadr (the most learned of Iraq's ayatullahs) was executed along with his sister and other
prominent Shi'i figures.  At the same time, however, Hussein generously dispensed funds to support
mosque constructions.  Both strategies were designed to avoid a repeat of the Iranian revolution, and
underscored the gravity of the threat from the perspective of the Ba'th regime.
     The Ba'thi susceptibility to a Shi'i revolution was rooted in the socio-economic and political
developments unfolding in Iraq, developments that were accelerated in the post-war period,
including the massive migration to the urban areas, the protective posture of the clerical class and
the repressive political atmosphere under the Ba'th regime.  By 1980, the revolutionary potential of
Shi'ism was taken seriously by the Iraqi regime.  The aggressive rhetoric and practices emanating
from revolutionary Iran clearly exacerbated this potentially explosive situation.  Ultimately, Iraq
would be motivated to move against the nascent regime in Iran in order to remove this external
threat.  It is exceptionally difficult to assess, however, whether this threat emanating from Iran would
have sufficiently compelled the Ba'th regime to attack.  Nonetheless, the Iraqi decision to invade
would be affected by a third political dimension related to the outbreak of the war: the struggle by
the Ba'th regime to secure and stabilize oil revenues.
Oil and the War
    The struggle to secure and stabilize oil revenue constitutes the third political dimension relevant
to the outbreak of the war.  It would be incorrect to simply argue that the oil interests in Iraq caused
the war.  What is more plausible, however, is that the importance of oil revenues created special
vulnerabilities for the Ba'th regime, and this manifested itself in regional policy designed to reduce
these vulnerabilities.  Two frequently identified aspects of the war - Hussein's struggle for regional
hegemony and to a lesser extent the dispute over the Shatt al-Arab water way - are related to these
vulnerabilities.  As discussed above, the dramatic increase in oil revenues insulated the Ba'th regime
from any particular social class.  The revenues created a wider array of options for the state in
dealing with social classes and potentially explosive issues.  Periodic increases in wages, for
example, allowed the regime to avoid direct confrontations with the working class.  The campaign
of mosque constructions was implemented for similar effect.  Again, the absorption of surplus labour
into the notoriously inefficient public service sector of the Iraqi state is similarly geared.  The
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distribution of tens of thousands of television sets and cash donations to Kurdish families that were
forcibly removed from the border regions in the north provides yet another example of the important
political functions oil revenues.51  These cooptive strategies were utterly dependent upon oil money.
Through them the regime attempted to contain the subordinate classes and groups, at least to some
extent, by selectively responding to their demands.  One collective commentary on the Iraqi situation
summed up the situation well: `The regime could finance this political base-building thanks to the
almost unlimited funds available for all kinds of educational, welfare, industrial and other capital
projects.'52  Stated baldly, oil revenues were crucial for regime maintenance.
     By itself, these oil revenues would provide the regime with a strong impulse to secure and
promote this source of income.  But it is equally clear that dynamic class developments within Iraq
provided another motive for the regime.  More than simply creating the conditions for the expansion
of capitalism in Iraq, the Ba'thi state became the lifeline for the parasitic fraction of the Iraqi
bourgeoisie which includes contractors, brokers, bureaucrats and speculators.53  By 1975, for
example, there were 2,788 contractors officially registered with the state.  The fraction of the
bourgeoisie remains thoroughly dependent upon the state, fully relying upon the state sponsored
development projects to advance its interests, and frequently receiving generous concessions from
the state by being allowed to bypass tax and labour laws.  This parasitic bourgeoisie, in turn, forms
an important base of support for the regime.  State sponsored development, therefore, created
important new fractions among the capitalist class within Iraq during the 1970s.  This particular form
of capitalism in Iraq naturally retains a keen interest in maintaining oil revenues.
     Iraq, however, has perennially faced a situational vulnerability with respect to oil revenues, a
vulnerability that went far beyond normal fluctuations in the world market price for crude oil.  In the
late 1970s Iraq had three oil exporting outlets.  The first was the less profitable terminals off the Iraqi
coastline in the Gulf.  The second and third were pipelines through Syria and through Turkey.  Iraq,
therefore, had many of the vulnerabilities of a landlocked country.  The pipelines were the Achilles
heel of the Iraqi economy, rendering the Ba'th regime vulnerable to the undulations of international
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political conditions.  Indeed, the flow of Iraqi oil via the Syrian pipeline was subject to numerous
interruptions prior to the war.  The turmoil in Iran provided the Ba'th regime with a unique
opportunity to assert its presence in the Gulf and enhance its prestige within the Arab world.  Greater
influence in the Gulf region and entire control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway could only raise Iraq's
Arab stature.  Regional stature and influence within the Arab community is essential to enhancing
its influence over OPEC production and pricing policy.  Hence, the regime felt that political events
in Iran afforded it a unique opportunity to overcome its situational vulnerability.
The Move to War
    The Iraqi attack upon Iran was motivated by the Shi'i disturbances and by its situational
vulnerability to fluctuating oil revenues.  Iran figured prominently in both of these aspects,
intentionally aggravating the Shi'i situation in Iraq on the one hand and standing in the way of a
more prominent Iraqi role in regional oil affairs on the other.  The appearance of a unique
opportunity in the guise of internal Iranian disarray, especially within the military, would sufficiently
tip the scales in favour of direct Iraqi intervention.  After an escalation in border skirmishes between
the two countries through the summer of 1980, Iraq launched a full-scale invasion of Khuzistan on
September 22, 1980.
     All indications suggest that Hussein thought the war would be very short.  Within a month the
Iraqis had seized Khorramshahr and by the end of 1980 they had penetrated up 20 miles of the entire
Iranian front.  Within six months of the start of the war, however, Iranian counter-offensives were
beginning to take their toll upon the Iraqi army.  Two years after the initial invasion the war had for
the most part shifted onto Iraqi soil.  As the war passed through its third and fourth years it displayed
all the features of a deadlocked, attrited and drawn out affair.54  Attacks on oil tankers and direct
mutual missile assaults on Iraqi and Iranian towns did little to change this bleak scenario.  Attempts
to end the war by the Islamic Conference Organization, the Organization of Non-aligned countries,
the UN Secretariat General and the Warsaw Pact countries all failed.  Unilateral initiatives, notably
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by Algeria, met with similar success.  These failures prompted one commentator to sum up the
efforts of the international community as `routine and in the main futile.'55
PART III:  THE SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF ENDING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR
    In accounting for these failures to bring the war to an end we must again ponder the behaviour of
both regimes from the perspective of the societies in which they are embedded.  As with the research
on the causes of war, the diffuse and wide-ranging conflict management/resolution literature
generally fails to consider the prolongation and termination of war in terms of the wider
characteristics of society.  One stream of this literature examines the problem of institutionalizing
peaceful approaches to conflict management.56  Another large pool of research periodizes conflict
into crisis management57, the problem of conflict escalation58, and those processes - especially
bargaining and negotiation - aimed at terminating or resolving conflict.59  A body of literature has
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been erected around the vast array of social, political and military instruments available to manage
and resolve conflict, including peacekeeping forces60 and confidence and security building
measures.61  Considerable attention has also been given to the activities and roles of conflict
managers including international organizations and other third parties, regional powers, middle-
powers and superpowers.62  While the importance of certain social dimensions is suggested by
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occasional references to social and political instruments of conflict management, analysis of conflict
resolution is not undertaken from the perspective of societal dynamics.
     As argued here, however, the keys to understanding the prolongation of the war between Iraq and
Iran are precisely these elements of society which have conventionally been downplayed in conflict
resolution research.  That is, the protractedness of the Iran-Iraq war is related to political struggles
arising out of the wider social canvases of both countries.  In Iran especially, the war played a pivotal
role in the difficult process of revolutionary consolidation by the clerics.  Similarly, in Iraq, although
the outward willingness to end the war appeared much sooner, its prosecution still managed to carry
political advantages for the Ba'th regime.
The War and Iran
     The ascendency of the clerics in the revolutionary aftermath would only serve to bring the
contradictory social base of the revolution into sharper focus, a social base that was itself responsible
for deep conflicts within the new regime.  Broadly speaking, the line of the Imam faction promoted
a more radical platform capable of appealing to the population as a whole, while the more
conservative Hojjatiyeh faction maintained a certain fidelity to the traditional petty bourgeoisie and
other propertied interests.  Conflict over the such issues as the nationalization of foreign trade would
reveal these divergent lines within the regime.63  Gradually, the outlook of the more conservative
faction would prevail.  As the revolution entered the Thermidor, the engineering of social
consciousness would take on a crucial importance; political and social themes capable of
transcending class and group consciousness - the peasants, the working class, women and the urban
poor -  would be needed in order to maintain support for the regime.
     The difficulties in maintaining a wide base of support for the regime in view of the inherently
conflictual socio-economic outlooks of post-revolutionary Iranian society were evident to some
observers relatively quickly.  Ervand Abrahamian, for example, presciently dwelt upon one likely
effect of a direct invasion of Iran: `. . . the clergy are unlikely to find another public enemy as
unpopular as the shah against whom they can rally the whole population - unless, of course, a foreign
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enemy invades the country and threatens the existence of the entire nation.'64  Enter Iraq!  The clerics
would prove most adept at exploiting the war in order to establish their class hegemony.  The Ba'th
invasion provided the clerics with the axiomatic common enemy; xenophobic themes were fully
utilized in order to politically mobilize and secure support for the theocratic regime.  The regime
extolled Iraq as the embodiment of all that was antithetical to the Islam; the tenets of the theocratic
populist project were brutally confirmed.   For the ` ulama, the war became nothing less than the war
against the `Great Satan' incarnate.  In short, through the invasion the Islamic character of the
revolution was honed and sharpened and this process undoubtedly served to provide a degree of
social cement for the deeply fractured Iranian society.  The defense of Islam, by implication, became
the defense of the theocratic regime.65
     The war provided an umbrella like pretext for the various facets of revolutionary consolidation
in the Islamic Republic.  First, the war assisted in legitimizing the thorough and often brutal
repression of opposition forces.  At the outset of the revolution a number of potential opposition
groups existed and could have possibly seized state control or at least hindered the political project
of the clerics.  They fell into four different streams including the secularists (with a number of
political parties), the left groups, including the Fedayeen and the well organized and powerful
Mojahedin, and the regionalist/nationals which included most prominently the Kurds numbering 2.5
million.  This latter group also included the Arabs, Azerbaijani Turks, the Qashqa'i Turks, and the
Turkomanis.66  The war was exercised in conjunction with a full-scale assault on the Iranian Kurdish
insurgency.  The peshmergas were subject to similar sensational methods of warfare as Iraq,
including human-wave assaults, and the Kurdish people of Iran, estimated at over 10 per cent of the
population, were subject to Shi'i propaganda, detention, forced resettlement and outright massacre.67
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Finally, the regime faced varying degrees of opposition from women.  Oppressive conceptions of
gender in Iran were reinforced with the general desecularization of Iranian society.  Women were
forced, for example, to observe the hejab and were encouraged to preoccupy themselves with the
`precious function of motherhood, rearing alert and active human beings.'68  On the whole, the
opposition's effectiveness was ` adversely affected by the war.'69  By the third year of the Revolution
most of the opposition to the regime had been exiled or simply extirpated.  In 1981 the Council of
National Resistance was established in Paris.  This broad coalition included the Mujahidin, the
Kurdish Democratic Party, Bani-Sadr and the National Democratic Front.  By 1983 it became clear
that even those left-wing parties that had initially cooperated with the regime, such as the Tudeh,
were virtually wiped out.  The intolerant atmosphere of the regime received its most poignant
confirmation with the growing influence of the stridently anti-communist Hojjatiyeh faction among
the ruling group.
     The war also assisted the regime in expanding and securing control over crucial post-
revolutionary institutions and consolidating control over the traditional apparatus of the state.
Figuring most prominently here was the pasdaran.  As a counterbalance to the army, the
Revolutionary Guards grew to the point that they outnumbered the Regular Army.  The
establishment of the Ministry of Revolutionary Guards confirmed the permanency of this feature of
the post-revolutionary state's coercive apparatus.  A further element of the post-revolutionary
security apparatus was the basijis (Mobilization of the Oppressed) which tended to draw younger
recruits.  Both the Basijis and the Pasdaran provided the theocrats with important counterbalancing
forces against the army, especially in the earlier stages of the revolution when Bani-Sadr's close
relationship to the regular army was arousing suspicion within the IRP.70  Moreover, at least four
different intelligence groups were charged with the responsibility for controlling the regular army
by policing it, handling agitprop, identifying cells of opposition and controlling suspected military
personnel.  The ranks of these organizations, moreover, tended to draw heavily among the young,
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urban poor and lower middle classes which had the effect of securing support for the regime.71  The
civilian counterpart to the pasdaran - the Jahad-e Sazandeghi or Reconstruction Crusade - was
another popular organization commandeered by the IRP in order to concretize rural support for the
regime.72  Within the legislative apparatus clerical control was assured by institutional changes such
as establishment of a clerical body known as the Shura (Council of Guardians) which can veto
parliamentary legislations.73  More generally, the war was used as a pretense for extensive purges
within the state bureaucracy and within the various media.  Again, the war was enlisted to rationalize
contentious policy.74  It also served as a pretext to further the desecularization of Iranian society.
To this end, changes within the educational system, including textbook revisions and the removal
of teachers and students not sufficiently Islamic, were also undertaken.  Criminal, civil and
commercial statutes were re-written under the supervision of Shi'i jurists.  By the summer of 1982
all secular laws were deemed null and void.
     Above and beyond the elimination of political opposition, the war was used as a pretext for the
repression of any potentially disruptive social action.  Most notable here was the stark suppression
of worker activity in the aftermath of the revolution using whatever economic, political, ideological
or military means were necessary.75  In order to combat worker militancy the regime set up labour
sections within the Pasdaran and the Basijis.  Although the working class may have been the
`battering ram' of the revolution, the regime expressed early and immediate opposition to their basic
form of workers' organization known as the shura.76  The regime continued to Islamicize the
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workplace through the establishment of Islamic associations which stood in opposition to the
independent shuras and which acted as vehicles for the establishment of maktabi management
(Islamic management).  Maktabi management acquired prevalence with the removal of Bani-Sadr
and the waning influence of `liberals'.  The regime proclaimed work as a religious duty: `To work
itself,' Khomeini admonished cement workers in Tehran, `is a jihad (crusade) for the sake of God;
God will pay for this jihad - the jihad of labour which you [workers] are carrying out inside the
barricade of the factory.'77  
     The continuation of the war on Iran's part can thus be attributed to the distinct advantages that
it brought to the theocrats.  The war provided the regime with a unique opportunity to consolidate
its power through the elimination of political opposition, the extension of control of revolutionary
institutions and the containment of any disruptive social behaviour.  Equally importantly, the war
allowed the theocrats to appeal to unifying social themes in a deeply fractured post-revolutionary
society.  As long as the war brought these advantages for the clerics, efforts to end it would not
gather significant momentum within ruling circles.
The War and Iraq
     Saddam Hussein's confidence at the outset of the war led him to attach impossible conditions to
the first United Nations ceasefire resolution of September 28, 1980.  With the turning tides of the
war in the next two years, however, Hussein became more and more inclined to end it.  By the end
of 1982 Iraq was clearly prepared to search for a compromise solution to end the war.78  Moreover,
Iraq's attempts to internationalize the war, especially through tanker attacks, were designed to bring
further international pressure on Iran after initial efforts to draw the war to a close had failed.
Despite the military setbacks, however, there were contradictory pressures operating on Saddam
Hussein, pressures that would ultimately allow Iraq to live with the war as long as requisite revenues
for its prosecution could be maintained.  Indeed, minimal financing was sustained through two
means.  First, the regime was able to maintain some oil revenues.  Attacks by Iran on Iraq's southern
port facilities, along with the closing of the Syrian pipeline, had caused a drastic decline in Iraq's oil
revenues in the early years of the war.  Nonetheless, the regime was able to partially recover.  In
1985, for example, Iraq opened an oil pipeline into Saudi Arabia, and it was also able to export oil
overland by truck to the Jordanian port of Aqaba.  Secondly, the Ba'th regime supplemented its
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revenues through the provision of large quantities of cash, credit and oil exchanges, especially from
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
     Despite these problems, however, the war afforded the regime with unique opportunities to
extend its political control.  The war allowed the regime to engage in its own populist strategies, and
in the context of the Ba'thi struggle for social consciousness the effects of this opportunity should
not be underestimated.  When the war was carried into Iraqi territory, Hussein's position as defender
of the Arab nation was fully exploited.  Bombed-out shops in the city of Basra were strewn with
posters hailing Hussein as `the second great conqueror of the Persian Army.'79  The `Iraqi man'
became the national symbol, transcending any class, religious or ethnic fractures of Iraqi society.
The Arab/Persian dimension to the war was trumpeted loudly by the regime, as clearly evident in
the name given by Iraq to the war - Quadisiyyat Saddam - which harkens back to the Arab/Persian
struggles of the seventh century.  In short, the Ba'th regime skilfully held the war out in the cause
of the Arab nation.80
      As was the case in Iran, the war also provided a pretext for continuing the repressive politics of
the Ba'th regime.  The regime used the war to justify repressive labour practices and to extend the
oppression of Iraqi women: ` Baghdad is plastered with anti-contraception posters exhorting mothers
to breed for their country.'81  The regime was also able to fill its labour shortages through Egyptian
migrant labour numbering at a staggering 1 million workers.82  Aside from providing a much needed
pool of labour, migrant workers insured that labour disturbances will be kept to a minimum.  The
regime also abolished the state-controlled federation of trade unions and rescinded the labour code
of 1970.  Perhaps the clearest use of the `war pretext' lies in the relationship between the Ba'th
regime and the Kurdish insurgency.  The regime engaged in an extensive counter-insurgency
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campaign against the Kurds, a campaign that included massive relocation programmes, sanitation
zones along its Turkish and Iranian borders and brutal practices such as chemical warfare.83
     The utter annihilation of any formal political opposition within Iraq helped to insure that vocal
protests against the war would be muted.  Equally importantly, the war itself caused fragmentation
among the underground opposition movement in Iraq, especially between the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan, the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Iraqi Communist Party.84  At the same time, the
regime did its best to insulate its social base, the bourgeoisie, from the negative effects of the war,
especially as state revenues ran thin.85  Evidence suggests that private sector expansion in Iraq
continued unabated during the war.86  In the end, the war provided the regime with opportunities to
extend its political grip over Iraq society.  Understandably, the removal of the war pretext was of
serious concern to the Ba'th regime as the likelihood of a ceasefire became evident in 1988.  As one
commentator on the Iraqi scene wrote: `After the ceasefire Saddam Hussein is no longer able to
claim he is defending the homeland or use the war as a justification and smokescreen for mass
repression and terror in Iraq.'87
Termination of the War
     Hence, although the war certainly bore heavy material and human costs, it brought clear political
advantages to both regimes.  The deep fractures in both societies could be glossed over in the
interests of the war effort, and the benefits would accrue almost exclusively to the regimes exercising
power.  The social corollary of this reality, however, is the equally clear extension of oppressive
relations in both countries.  The social power of subordinate classes and groups - especially the rural
and urban poor, the Kurds, the working classes and women - slipped appreciably.  The social and
political effects of this slippage will last well beyond the conclusion of the fighting.
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     By the late 1980s, almost a decade after the war had erupted, a few crucial points cannot be
overlooked.  In Iran, the process of revolutionary consolidation was essentially completed.  By 1988,
the regime faced `no internal threat to its power.'88  In an important sense, the war had outlived its
usefulness for the regime and was becoming more and more of a burden.  The Islamic Republic still
faced enormous challenges including staggering unemployment, deplorable urban living conditions
and an altogether stagnant economy.  Increasing US involvement was also raising the stakes of the
war.  In 1986, moreover, the price of a barrel of oil drastically fell from $28 US to $10 US.  By 1988
it had only recovered by 8 US dollars.  This decline undoubtably put great additional strain upon
both regimes.  In the summer of 1988 Iran agreed to abide by Resolution 598 of the UN Security
Council which included inter alia an immediate ceasefire, provisions for a UN observer force, an
immediate release of prisoners of war and the establishment of an `impartial body' to decide upon
the responsibility of the war.
     On the whole for Iraq, the last year of the war had brought a sharp turn-around.  Throughout the
first half of 1988 Iraq launched new offensives against Iran and occupied more of its territory.
Hussein was reluctant to end the war in 1988, and the Ba'thi regime was attempting to sabotage the
ceasefire efforts.  Even with the Iranian agreement to abide by the framework set out in UN
resolution 598, Iraq continued to prosecute the war.  In the end however, undoubtedly in the face of
mounting international pressure, the steep yearly cost of the war, further declines in oil revenues and
the potential for a second Iranian reversal, Hussein reluctantly accepted UN resolution 598 as a basic
working framework.  On August 20, 1988 the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group
(UNIIMOG) went into operation along much of the 1,170 kilometre common border between the
two countries.
     Ten years after the initial Iraqi invasion numerous outstanding issues plagued the pursuit of any
permanent official peace between the two countries.  Although the fighting had ceased, Iraq, for its
part, continued to occupy about 1,600 square kilometres of Iranian territory.  The apparently
unsolvable disagreement with respect to the Shatt al-Arab waterway remained, with Iran calling for
a return to the terms of the 1975 Algiers Accord and Iraq continuing to favour full sovereignty of
the channel.  Important differences also continued with respect to the nearly 100,000 prisoners of
war held between the two countries.  On the diplomatic front, four rounds of official negotiations
culminated in face to face meetings between the foreign ministers of Iran and Iraq in the summer of
1990.  These exchanges appear to have laid the foundations for a summit between Hashemi
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Rafsanjani of Iran and Saddam Hussein of Iraq in order to negotiate a permanent peace between the
two countries.
PART IV:  CONCLUSION
     From the perspective of its length, its human and material tolls and its sensational practices
including chemical warfare and human-wave assaults, the Iran-Iraq war stands as the Third World's
War I.  The war was largely a local affair.  It was fought between two regimes resting uneasily upon
deeply fractured societies.  In a significant manner the war was the product of conflicting social
forces unleased by the gradual insertion of Iran and Iraq into the world economy.  This is not to
suggest that the war was inevitable in the sense that individual intervention played little or no part
in the matter.  On the other hand, however, it is to suggest that the war was hardly surprising.
     The Clausewitzian dictum that `war is the continuation of politics by other means' must be
modified slightly to accommodate this crucial socio-political dimension.  As a result war becomes
`the continuation of domestic politics by other means'. Conventional analysis into war and conflict
resolution tends to overlook the pivotal importance of the socio-political dimension.  This paper has
demonstrated that undulations among social forces in each society were largely responsible for the
heightened tensions between Iran and Iraq in the late 1970s.  Internal political conflict rooted in
fundamental social divisions created new issues of contention between the two states and resurrected
older conflicts.  These intense political struggles arising from the wider social canvases in Iran and
Iraq certainly increased the likelihood that the war would be politically advantageous for the ruling
regimes.  Indeed, in September of 1980 Iraq exercised its military option for political gain.  And the
same social and political struggles were also responsible for the prolonged course of the fighting.
Third party intervention was fruitless until the regimes were ready to end the fighting, but as long
as the war brought forth considerable political advantage it would be tolerated and even encouraged.
     Through this modification of the Clausewitzian dictum, moreover, we can begin to appreciate the
social costs of the Iran-Iraq war.  The concern with barrels/per/day, GNPs or even body counts
occludes the startling social costs associated with the war.  Both regimes sharpened their repressive
capacities and deftly manipulated themes of social unity in order to overcome the deep cleavages in
their societies.  The social power of oppressed classes and groups waned considerably while their
political expressions were thoroughly extirpated.  The fruits of the Iran-Iraq war unequivocally
accrued to the regimes conducting it.  The extent to which we see these social dynamics reproduced
in other Third World regions may foretell the outbreak of equally devastating wars, but wars whose
spoils should be exclusively measured in terms of gains and losses of the oppressed classes and
groups within these societies.
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